

document it, no matter how well you can prove it, no matter that you can prove that if you go back, you will be targeted for death—do not qualify for asylum in the United States of America. That is a change that has to be closely examined.

I met a woman in a respite center down in Texas. She had been released because she was very pregnant. So they said: Well, we are not going to put her in prison. We are going to release her until she has her hearing. She told me her story. Her family had gotten into a dispute with the drug gang that ran the community. So they had sent a team of people to gang rape her.

Her life had been threatened, and she had to leave immediately. She couldn't make accommodations for her children. Her children couldn't come with her. She didn't know how they were. She said: I have no idea who the father of this child is because it is a product of the gang attack. She qualified under our rules for asylum if she could document her case, until 2 days ago, but now she can't go to that asylum hearing under this new rule designed to keep people who have experienced enormous trauma abroad from qualifying—who have always qualified.

Not only is this administration inflicting trauma and pain on children to send a message to some other group of families overseas, but they are changing the rules for folks who arrived here, who have stood up for so long and stood up so well.

I think about how Lady Liberty no longer has a torch. Lady Liberty's torch has been snuffed out. The symbol to the world under the Sessions-Trump-John Kelly policy is, you will be treated as a criminal if you flee persecution and come to the United States. She doesn't carry a torch. She carries a pair of handcuffs, and that is absolutely wrong.

When John F. Kennedy wrote that "this country has always served as a lantern in the dark," he could never have imagined the evil policy, the darkness of heart, the deliberate infliction of pain and trauma on children that would come out of this administration's policy.

It is our responsibility in this Chamber to debate this issue, to change that policy, and say America will never allow children to be deliberately harmed to send some political message to some family overseas. In fact, we will never allow them to be deliberately harmed under any circumstance. Let's restore the lantern that Lady Liberty has so proudly borne for so long.

Thank you.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska.

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BILL

Mr. SASSE. Mr. President, I rise to draw attention to one particularly important element of the National De-

fense Authorization Act, which sits before this body.

First, it is worth noting that—despite the bizarre dysfunction of the last couple of days around here—the NDAA is usually a time each year when the Senate looks like an actual deliberative body. We look like an actual legislature.

Most of the typical bickering and made-for-TV sound bites get set aside this week or two every year as we focus on the first purpose of the Federal Government, which is to provide for the common defense.

The NDAA reveals our shared commitment to the men and women in uniform who serve our country so well. This legislation aims to scrutinize and annually reprioritize among the many important tasks that are going on in the Pentagon and in the broader Department of Defense.

If we are going to call on the men and women in the armed services who defend our freedoms to stand ready to defend us and to go into battle when necessary, we must equip them with the right tools to be able to get their job done. That is what this legislation is about each year, but it is not enough to simply be about defending against traditional enemies and traditional threats. We also need to use this annual occasion to pause and deeply look at new and emerging threats we face.

When you ask national security and intelligence experts in private and in public what keeps them up at night, as I do multiple times every week—I ask this question of people in the SCIF. You find something strange in this city. You have an agreement. Public and private sector experts, legislative and executive branch folks, career folks, political folks, whether Republican or Democratic, have widespread agreement that the long-term domain challenge we face is that America is woefully unprepared for the age of cyber war.

Thirty years ago, when the digital age was still in its infancy and the first computer viruses and bugs were created, the United States did not have a cyber doctrine to defend our interests. That was understandable in 1986 because these were new threats. It doesn't make any sense in 2018, and yet it is still true. We don't really have any coherent doctrine to defend our interests. This is inexcusable.

We are, today, overwhelmingly the most advanced digital economy and digital society in the world. Thus, we are, almost inevitably, the No. 1 target globally for cyber crime, but our adversaries are attacking us not merely as targets of opportunity, they are also attacking us because they sense our passivity.

State and nonstate actors alike are becoming regularly more brazen. Year over year, from 2012 to 2013, to 2014, to 2015, and to the present, we see this brazen action coming from China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and lots of jihadi nonstate actors. Yet we still do

not have a cyber doctrine to guide our planning process, we don't have a cyber doctrine to guide our actions, and we are unprepared for the warfare of 2020, 2025, and 2030.

How can this be? How can we lack a strategic plan, not merely to respond to the attacks against U.S. public and private sector networks but also to go a step further and deter them in real time? Why do we lack this plan?

Since joining this body in January of 2015, alongside the Presiding Officer, I have pushed for a strategic plan that clearly articulates how we will defend ourselves against the new threats in this cyber space. Unfortunately, this call has fallen on deaf ears in both the legislature and the executive branch, both Democratic and Republican administrations. There is far too little urgency. When you speak with generals, when you speak with CIA station chiefs around the world, nobody disputes this. Everyone knows we are unprepared, and we are underinvested in this domain. Yet no one is really in charge.

Fortunately, we are taking a major step in this NDAA to address this deficit in our war planning. While no one piece of legislation and no single proposal can possibly address all of our cyber deficits, there is, nonetheless, some very good news in this NDAA for both the public as a whole and those of us who are losing sleep about our cyber underpreparedness.

The legislation we are debating today, and will vote on in some form tomorrow, includes a proposal to bring American national security into the 21st century by establishing a Cyberspace Solarium Commission. This Commission is modeled after President Dwight Eisenhower's 1953 Project Solarium. At that time, as the Soviet Union was on the cusp of achieving a devastating thermonuclear weapon, Ike recognized that our Nation needed a clear strategy. We needed to be able to defend ourselves and our allies against the expanding Soviet threat. This is where both the historian and the strategist in me gets excited.

Never one to lack a plan, Eisenhower sequestered three different teams of experts at the National War College for 6 weeks. He tasked them with articulating a menu of large-scale, strategic frameworks for the age of nuclear confrontation. The result of Ike's competitive effort was a new national security directive, NSC 162/2, that charted a course that would successfully guide U.S. policy and bureaucratic development over many decades of the Cold War.

We desperately need similar strategic clarity today. The threats to American security are actually even more dynamic and unpredictable than in those early years of the Cold War. Then there were giant technological and scale barriers to becoming a nuclear power; whereas, today, launching a cyber attack that has global reach requires only some coding capability, a laptop, and an internet connection.

This new group, the Cyberspace Solarium Commission, will be made up of 13 members, putting cyber and national security experts, along with many Silicon Valley types, in the same room to debate, to think through, and to propose a comprehensive path forward to guide our cyber policy.

One of the reasons Ike's Solarium Commission worked so well was because there was urgency and focus. Under this Cyberspace Solarium Commission, there will be a deadline for the delivery of a comprehensive plan with blue sky freedom to reenvision all current bureaucracies and organizations

across our cyber plan and response units within 1 year.

By September 1, 2019, this Commission would be delivering to both the President's Cabinet and to the defense and intelligence committees of the Congress a comprehensive plan to guide cyber security policymaking going forward.

We cannot continue to stand idly by waiting for a massive cyber attack to occur and then figure out how we will use that as a catalyst to begin future planning. We should be planning and prioritizing before the crisis. For 30 years, we haven't yet developed or committed to a serious strategy. Now

is the time to act, and this NDAA represents one of the best innovations we have had; that we can set up this national Cyberspace Solarium Commission to report back, within 1 year, a comprehensive plan.

Thank you.

ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 9:30 A.M.
TOMORROW

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate stands adjourned until 9:30 a.m. tomorrow.

Thereupon, the Senate, at 6:39 p.m., adjourned until Thursday, June 14, 2018, at 9:30 a.m.